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Marketization and varieties of accountability relationships in employment 
services: comparing Denmark, Germany and Great Britain 
Jantz, B. Klenk, T. Larsen, F. & Wiggan, J.  
Introduction 
In the past decade European countries have reformed their welfare states to encourage labor 
market ‘activation’ of working age benefit clients (Jantz & Jann, 2013). This has transformed the 
governance of public employment services (PES). Traditional bureaucratic instruments based upon 
norms of standardized treatment have been supplemented or replaced by output targets and 
performance management, decentralization, entrepreneurial action or case management 
(Considine, Lewis & O'Sullivan, 2011). A striking feature of reforms to PES has been the growth of 
quasi-markets. Our focus is the accountability of employment services under conditions of this 
quasi-market expansion. It has been argued that marketized employment services significantly 
increase the scope and complexity of accountability challenges (Benish, 2014). Contracting out 
makes accountability chains much longer, and thus more difficult to allocate and coordinate 
responsibility and to secure the transparency needed for public accountability. Even though 
accountability concerns are not new in the context of public administration (Bovens, Goodin & 
Schillemans, 2014) and in the context of welfare administration (Lægreid & Mattei, 2013), we still 
know relatively little about the consequences for the democratic control of social services provided 
by a mix of public and private providers (van Berkel & Borghi, 2008). 
 
How do instruments of market accountability - such as financial incentives through contracts and 
price competition – supersede and shape democratic and administrative forms of accountability, and 
vice versa? While public service provision has undergone a significant shift towards market based 
governance in Western democracies, the core government institutions still have the function to 
ensure fairly traditional political and administrative authority, emphasizing values, such as due 
process, procedural fairness, and equal treatment. Thus, institutional change in public service 
provision encounters a considerable degree of institutional stability, an argument put forward by 
Pierre (2012). Next to the role public bureaucracy plays in market accountability arrangements there 
is a lack of knowledge about how market accountability forms relate to the particularity of the 
economic and welfare institutions of a state. Only a limited number of publications take a systematic 
international comparative approach to analyzing such developments (van Berkel & Borghi, 2008). 
Consequently, additional research on activation accountability regimes and their dynamics by 
comparing public-private mixes in different countries has been requested (Benish, 2014). 
 
This article contributes to this through an empirical comparative examination of how marketization 
in employment services is transforming accountability in three European states; Great Britain, 
Germany and Denmark. We ask: 
 
• Is the governance shift towards markets followed by a shift towards mechanisms of market 
accountability? 
• How does the use of market accountability relate to other accountability forms? 
• What are the democratic implications of market accountability in the governance of employment 
services? 
 
Research design and methods 
With Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries have been selected that are representative of 
different ‘welfare regime’ ideal types and systems of labour administration. 
The distinct configurations of institutions in conservative (Germany), social democratic 
(Denmark) and liberal (Great Britain) welfare regimes has affected the pace and form of both the 
turn to activation policies and the nature of employment service modernization (van 
Berkel, Sager & Ehrler, 2012; Bonoli, 2013). Denmark adopted activation reforms in the early 1990s, 
followed by Great Britain in the mid to late 1990s, whereas in Germany these developed a decade 
later, something Bonoli (2013) attributes to the constraints imposed by the German social insurance 
system. Different preferences for particular policy interventions, meanwhile, has given rise to both 
qualitatively different systems of employment service provision (work first or human capital 
orientated mixes) and distinct patterns of spending (high in social democratic, middle in continental 
and low in liberal countries) (Bonoli, 2013). From a continental Rechtsstaat perspective like Germany 
(and to a lesser degree Denmark), the state is a central integrating force within society with the 
actions of individual public servants and individual citizens being set in a context of rule--following 
and legal control. Administrative practice is strongly influenced by Weber's rational bureaucracy 
model with its emphasis on clear lines of accountability within a strongly hierarchical system. The 
Rechtsstaat perspective, however, meets the equally strong tradition of involving the social partners 
into labor market policy. Hence, corporatist network governance is added to hierarchical 
governance, in particular when it comes to the delivery of services. Corporatist network governance 
systems can rely in part on trust and fear of reputation loss as important accountability mechanisms 
and such mechanisms may imply less need for market instruments or greater obstacles to their 
introduction as noted above. In Great Britain, in contrast, public administration is guided by ‘public 
interest' principles rooted in the Common Law tradition in which no divide between state and 
society or between public and private law is recognized. In addition, Great Britain abandoned its 
limited experiment with corporatist governance in employment provision in the late 1980s. Hence, 
the concepts of marketization have had a much easier acceptance in these traditions. The rather 
hierarchical governance by the centre has been transformed by a growing reliance on market 
instruments such as contracting out with competitive tendering. We expected that across all three 
states the growing use of quasi-markets increased the salience of contractual relationships as a 
leading accountability instrument. We also expected that market instruments are accompanied by 
country specific hybridized modes of accountability, shaped by political context and by 
characteristics of institutions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 15), in particular by their institutional 
flexibility (Pierre, 2012). Great Britain as a liberal welfare regime and ‘committed marketizer’ of 
employment services (van Berkel, de Graaf & Sirovátka 2012) for example, could be expected to 
have gone furthest in embedding market instruments as the dominant form of accountability, but as 
we discuss this does not translate into the replacement of all alternative accountability instruments. 
 
The time line for the three case studies covers a ten year period, starting in the early 
2000s and ending in the early 2010s. The exact period of examination in the three countries varies 
slightly, depending on the particular reform trajectories of the three countries under consideration. 
In Germany, the period of study starts with the implementation of the Hartz reforms (starting in 
2003), in Denmark the 2002 labor market reform ("More people into jobs") has been selected as a 
starting point, in UK the study considers the reform trajectory initiated under New Labour (2008-10) 
and continued by the Conservative-Liberal Coalition 
Government (2010-15). 
 
In methodological respects, the paper is based on a qualitative approach combining an extensive 
document analysis with the analysis of expert interviews. The document analysis included policy 
documents, audit reports, evaluations as well as academic literature. The document analysis was 
complemented by a number of semi-structured qualitative expert interviews with politicians, senior 
bureaucrats and providers of employment services (23 interviews in total). The interviews lasted an 
hour on average and were (partly) transcribed before the analysis. Qualitative thematic analysis 
(Boyatzis, 1998) was used to grasp the following dimensions of the accountability settings in the 
three countries: 
• the accountability relations in marketized service provision according to the ideal types of political, 
administrative, market and network accountability 
• the interplay between different accountability mechanisms 
• the democratic anchorage of the changing modes of service provision 
 
The article proceeds as follows: we outline our model of four distinct ‘ideal types’ (democratic, 
administrative, network and market) which we use to categorize accountability relationships and 
elaborate upon the relationship between marketization and accountability. This is followed by the 
three case studies. The results section examines shifts in accountability in the case studies and 
critically reflects on how marketization changes the mix of instruments used in each case to create 
new hybrid models of accountability. 
 
Accountability in public policy: ideal types 
A variety of different conceptual approaches to accountability and classifications of accountability 
exist in the literature (Willems & Van Dooren, 2012, pp. 1020–1022). We start from the assumption 
that accountability is an interaction between two or more actors. Accountability can be 
conceptualized (1) as a system of knowing and evaluating someone’s behaviour according to some 
standards and (2) a system of rewards or sanctions that are depending on these evaluations. 
Accountability as a social relationship suggests that formal rules, structures and roles of the 
relationship are dynamic arrangements subject to negotiation, interpretation, change and 
transformation. Accountability relationships can thus be defined as an institutional setting in the 
sense that they encompass a system of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors 
may choose. If these rules are violated, the actors have to face consequences ex post. Actors will, 
however, anticipate these consequences and act accordingly if they want to prevent the sanctions. 
Accountability relationships guide behavior and stabilize expectations. They allocate resources (i.e. 
sanctioning powers), constitute events and debating space (i.e. annual meetings), empower and 
constrain actors and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescribed rules. 
 
If we perceive accountability as a social relationship, the main distinction between different 
accountability regimes should be drawn according to their dominant mode of coordination and 
control, i.e. their mode of governance. Social sciences have long recognized 
three distinct modes of governance organized around hierarchy, competition or market and network 
or community (Newman, 2007). Each mode is associated with an accountability template (Scott, 
2000) with distinctive features that are integral to their capacity to operate as mode of coordination 
and control. In the public realm, accountability normally applies to the hierarchical relationships of 
public sector organizations to render account to elected politicians, superiors or externally to audit 
institutions or courts. However we differentiate the public domain of accountability into democratic 
and administrative. Democratic accountability operates through electoral processes and 
administrative accountability operates through hierarchical control of subordinates. We distinguish 
four different accountability types which are relevant for the understanding of Public Employment 
Services: democratic, administrative, market and network accountability (table 1). 
 
Insert table 1. 
 
Democratic accountability is responsiveness to citizens and political constituents. In a democracy, 
accountability is thought to form a closed chain of delegation and answerability for the fulfillment of 
the delegated tasks that starts and ends with the sovereign people, the parliament, the government, 
the ministers and the public administration acting as intermediates (Strøm, 2000). 
 
Administrative accountability is closely related to the question of democratic accountability. It is 
important to distinguish between the democratic and the administrative realm. Politicians and 
bureaucrats have different roles in political decision making and implementation; but furthermore 
the norms and values by which their conducts are judged differ widely. Administrative accountability 
aims first and foremost at compliance with the political and programmatic provisions adopted by the 
government and at conformity with the legally established rules and norms, the obedience to 
organizational policies and deference to professional expertise (Koliba, Mills & Zia, 2011). 
Market accountability coordinates exchange through competition and contracts. In contrast to 
democratic accountability that (in theory) affords equal weight to all citizens’ right to call a public 
organization to account, in private markets accountability is more limited to the relationships 
between owners of the organization and particular groups of individuals, such as clients or 
employees (Mulgan, 2006). Consumers of services (or the public purchaser) and 
owners/shareholders in the delivery organization judge the actions of the provider according to the 
criteria of price, quality and return on financial investments. Managers give account about their 
strategies and decisions whilst customers judge the performance of the organization and hold it to 
account with their decision to buy or not to buy. Network accountability: Whereas prices and 
contracts constitute the principal means of coordination in market relationships, social relationships 
based on trust serve a similar function in networks. Network accountability is mainly characterized 
by horizontal lines of accountability in contrast to democratic and administrative accountability, 
where vertical lines are dominant. Individuals/organizations are first and foremost accountable to 
their peer group, thus the content of accountability relations, as well as the instruments and 
mechanisms of account giving, are not externally imposed but defined by members within the 
network themselves. It is the fear of a loss of reputation amongst peers and the ‘shadow of the 
future’ which ensures appropriate behavior. 
 
Marketization and accountability – exploring the linkages 
The increased use of market mechanisms in the reform of the PES has involved creation of quasi-
markets where a purchaser-provider-split is introduced (LeGrand, 1991) and the PES starts to 
contract-out provision to third parties. However, as van Berkel, Sager and Ehrler (2012) have pointed 
out, the notion of a monopolistic public agency becoming a purchaser should not be taken too 
strictly: many countries have a long tradition of involving third parties in employment services 
provision. What’s more, even after the introduction of quasi-markets public organizations can 
continue to provide services themselves. Thus, the governance of employment services shifts from 
one hybrid arrangement to another hybrid arrangement, with the former being more close to the 
public provision ideal type and the latter more close to the market ideal type. The expectation of 
recent labor market reforms is that the creation of quasi-markets, competitive tendering as well as 
price and performance orientation, will result in services delivered more efficiently and effectively 
(Larsen & Wright, 2014). The impact of governance reforms - especially of marketization – on 
accountability is still disputed. In particular there are two questions critically discussed: first, 
whether reforms lead to less, more, or even too much accountability; second whether the new 
accountability arrangements are appropriate. 
 
With regard to the degree of accountability, proponents of marketization argue that marketization 
inevitably involves some reduction of traditional mechanisms of accountability (Mulgan, 2006) as 
private sector actors are not subject to the same accountability requirements as public officials. Seen 
from the perspective of the citizens as the ultimate accountees, however, this is not problematic 
because public agencies, even when purchasing services, remain accountable for the services they 
buy (Mulgan, 2006, p. 48). The public still has the right to blame public agencies or ministers for bad 
public services when they are provided by private contractors. Furthermore, with marketization of 
public services new accountability mechanisms come into play. Competition makes private agencies 
providing public services aware that deficient provision may drive them out of the market. 
Moreover, new accountability tools which emphasize the performance function are introduced by  
layers of interaction among officials, contractors, and citizens or clients, making - all else equal - 
accountability more complex. However, this increased complexity of accountability arrangements is 
why marketization is also criticized in the accountability literature. The pluralization of governance 
actors not only creates competing, but very often conflicting accountability relations (Romzek, 
2000). Accountability is challenged because the accountor becomes diffused and it is not clear 
anymore who is called to account for what; the Minister, public officials, private firms or all of them? 
It is possible that ministers or public officials are held accountable by public opinion, although they 
de facto lack the necessary instruments to control the delivery of public services by private providers 
and may not be able to sanction them effectively. The final result may not be improved 
accountability, but multi accountability disorder (Koppell, 2005). Last but not least, markets deepen 
the conflict of interest between profit maximization and public value creation (Benish, 2014) which is 
not solved by increased complexity of accountability. The new structure makes the accountability of 
elected officials more remote and might encourage officials to shift blame to the contractors. Thus 
instead of being maintained, the responsibility of public officials for service provision might get 
weaker. Hence, how to uphold democratic accountability in private service provision seems to be a 
crucial challenge of marketized service delivery. 
 
The effect of marketization for accountability is still disputed (Mulgan, 2006) and 
dominated by assertions instead of examination of empirical evidence. It seems fruitless to 
continue the debate about less or more accountability through marketization. We assume 
there are trade-offs between different modes of accountability. Drawing on the work of 
Romzek (2000) we argue there is a close interrelation between the governance of service 
provision and accountability. When principles of delegation and service provision are 
changed towards marketization, accountability arrangements also change. Hence, when 
public service provision is marketized, accountability mechanisms may be reconfigured from 
political and administrative mechanisms characteristic of democratic accountability to market 
mechanisms, such as contracts between the public agency and the private service provider, 
performance criteria and reporting requirements. However, the counter assumption might be 
that marketization in service delivery is only loosely coupled to changes in accountability 
modes (Johnston & Romzek, 1999). Although new modes of accountability evolve, older 
interpretations will not necessarily disappear. Rather, new arrangements are layered on the 
accountability relationships already in place (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, pp. 15-18). The 
concept of layering explains gradual institutional transformation through a process in which 
new elements are attached to existing institutions and so gradually change their status and 
structure (Van der Heijden, 2011). Layering points us to the importance of focusing on 
national histories and characteristic patterns of institutions as the way institutional reforms 
work out depends on the interaction between the different institutional arrangements a certain 
system is built on. Institutional change, such as the introduction of quasi-markets as well as the 
corresponding accountability mechanisms, most often happens incrementally. Different actors try to 
change an institutional structure, while others aim to protect the status quo. The persistence of 
accountability modes may thus result from institutional inertia due to administrative practices like 
rule-orientation (Romzek, 2000), blame-avoidance (Hood, 2010) and close supervision of delegated 
action (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). Marketization and competition might impact on accountability, 
but ministerial accountability is a highly pervasive medium of accountability and bureaucracies are 
embedded in hierarchies, where rules and accepted procedure give firm shape to the accountability 
process (Page, 2010). We expect the co-existence of different and partly contradictory 
interpretations of accountability, i.e. an emergent hybridity. Turning to our cases, the following 
country studies map out the changing mix of accountability across different European states as 
marketization evolves. 
 
Case Studies 
Denmark 
The major marketization process in Denmark started in 2002. Due to thorough going criticisms of the 
public employment services as being too bureaucratic, expensive and ineffective the centre-right 
government proposed partial marketization of the employment services. Thus, the quasi-market in 
employment services was created in Denmark between 2002 and 2005. The regional PES was given 
free rein to organize contracting out, deciding what types of service and target groups of insured 
unemployed to contract out. The regional PES was able to decide upon forms of contracts and pay 
models. Their only obligation was that at least 10 percent of the unemployed should be in services 
fully or partly provided by non-public providers. This first wave of marketization of employment 
services was almost unregulated by the national authorities as regional public purchasers were 
provided with cash and freedom to contract out all services and target groups to create a market. 
The market for contracted services grew significantly after its initial creation, invigorated by the 
mandatory obligation to contract out services for unemployed. In 2005 around 46 percent of the 
insured unemployed were transferred to non-public providers (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2008). The 
project of creating a “market” succeeded, however the national audit office and other evaluations 
(Rambøll, 2004) criticized the lack of transparency and proper price competition. 
 
A second wave of marketization occurred following discovery that it was difficult to establish 
accountability relations (in relation to how the regional authorities engaged with non-public 
providers) at the same time as documenting cost savings (price competition) and innovation 
(Rambøll, 2004). As a response to criticism by the national audit office a reform was launched in 
2005. This introduced a strong central (national) regulation of the market and national tendering 
with a focus on strong price competition and 75 percent performance related payment compulsory. 
Accountability was enforced through more market incentives, but more procedural and corporate 
governance was also put back in place to re-regulate the deregulated market (Bredgaard & Larsen, 
2008). Democratic, administrative and market accountability was strengthened, while partnership or 
network based relation was reduced. The reform nearly halved the number of insured unemployed 
being transferred to non-public providers. The national tendering and the performance related 
payment model were mandatory up until 2011. However, the results of the model were 
disappointing. The combination of high-price competition, high risks for providers (waiting up to six 
months for full payment), and the drive to create short-term employment outcomes led to poor 
services by many of the private providers. The market competed on provider costs for service rather 
than innovative solutions. Although there were variations among the providers, media-reported 
“scandals” revealed examples of inferior services for the unemployed. This gave for-profit service 
providers a bad reputation and faith in market solutions among political and administrative decision 
makers declined. The third wave of marketization took place from around 2010 and was affiliated 
with another reform that dissolved the PES and handed employment services to the municipalities. 
Until then the municipalities had few experiences with employment service marketization. At first 
the national tendering system some mandatory requirement to refer certain target groups to non-
public providers were kept in place to make the municipalities keep with marketization. However, 
with the problems with low quality services delivered by non-public providers, the Social Democrat 
led government decided to dissolve the national tendering system and let the municipalities decide 
on using non-public providers. 
 
Implication of the marketization process on accountability relations 
The problem of finding the “right” balance between the various accountability forms has been an 
important “driver” for the development of the Danish marketization of employment services. 
Furthermore it is important to notice that the question of accountability has been a political issue. 
As labor market policy issues became more politicized and subject to criticism, the labor minister 
was - due to continuing strong ministerial accountability - constantly blamed (or held accountable) 
for problems with the PES. The political answer to this was decentralization through municipalization 
and marketization, making local actors more responsible for services. Other types of accountability 
combining marketized and administrative forms (e.g. performance management, prescribed 
procedures for services, economic incentives) were also launched from the national level creating a 
kind of decentralized centralization. Hence, a partial replacement of democratic accountability was 
sought by adding an additional layer of administrative accountability. Regarding the balancing of 
accountability types the Danish process of marketization illustrates the potential tension between 
using market mechanisms to improve effectiveness and efficiency versus fulfilling traditional political 
objectives of equity and responsiveness (Pierre, 2012). On the one hand democratic and 
administrative accountability is part of securing the fulfillment of the traditional political objectives, 
while market accountability is based upon competition as guarantee for effectiveness and efficiency. 
However, there are some contradictions between these two types of accountability in the process of 
marketization. The market accountability is in principle based upon the relation between the service 
provider and the client, where the clients’ choice of provider on the market is to make sure that only 
the best providers (with the highest quality of services) survive as service deliverers. However, as 
employment policies normally encompass an element of regulatory requirements or disciplining 
elements, which can be in opposition to the perceived preferences of the individual client (Larsen & 
Wright, 2014), the “market” in this context is not a conventional market, but a quasi-market, which 
among other things means that unemployed clients are represented by a public purchaser. To 
maintain a kind of market accountability, instead of user-choice two other control mechanisms are 
then applied: Price and results (measured by employment outcomes). In Denmark high price 
competition, high outcome based payment and the ability to generate short-term employment 
outcomes without much effort led to low quality services. The attempt to balance these dilemmas 
through a combination of administrative and market accountability turned out to be very difficult 
and involved high transaction costs. This has led to a withdrawal of national responsibility for 
services provided by non-public providers in the third wave of marketization, making this a 
matter solely for the municipalities. The municipalities attempt to balance the different layers 
of the accountability regime, but interestingly a movement towards more partnership or 
network based relations between the municipal purchasers and the providers seems to become 
more common. Tendering becomes more frequently replaced with discussing the terms of 
contracts in existing networks. Questions arise though as to whether this way to overcome dilemmas 
of balancing administrative and market accountability will create criticism for a lack of democratic 
and administrative accountability, based on the risk of nepotism and lack of transparency over 
awarding of contracts. In sum, in Denmark different accountability mechanisms are interrelated. 
While municipalization and marketization have weakened democratic accountability in the form of 
ministerial responsibility, the new market accountability mechanisms are not displacing other types 
of accountability. This process of layering, however, creates the need to balance market 
accountability with administrative and network accountability. 
Germany 
The growth of marketization of the German PES took place in the early 2000s. In 
Germany, like in Denmark, the major aim was to increase the efficiency and flexibility of the 
PES. Hence, a comprehensive reform package – called the ‘Hartz reforms’- was implemented which 
changed the internal structure of the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) and its interplay with 
private for- and non-profit providers. It also merged the (majority of the) former local agencies 
responsible for social assistance with the local agencies of the PES (Kemmerling & Bruttel, 2006). 
However, institutional adaption to increase efficiency and flexibility has already taken place before. 
To adopt public bureaucracy to new management and governance roles deregulation has been a 
widespread strategy (Pierre, 2012, p. 192). In 1994, the provision of placement services has been 
deregulated allowing private actors to participate in this market which had been monopolized by the 
PES. This trend has intensified with the implementation of the Hartz legislation which introduced 
vouchers for placement and training services and competitive tendering. With the placement 
voucher, a jobseeker can mandate a placement agency to find them a job. The new market for 
placement services was highly deregulated when the ‘Hartz reforms’ were introduced with no 
barriers for companies to register as private placement agency. Payment was strictly performance 
oriented (no cure-no pay). Only after criticism from trade unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 
2010) and the Federal Court of Auditors (Bundesrechnungshof, 2006) about misuses by companies 
and ‘creaming and parking’ effects, a certification and accreditation processes for placement 
agencies was introduced. The Hartz legislation also changed the governance of training and 
education programs considerably. These services were never delivered by the PES itself, but were 
contracted to providers mainly belonging to the social partners which were treated as preferred 
providers. 
 
The introduction of vouchers, certification and accreditation, planning, quality control and 
competitive tendering turned the cartel-like corporatist network into a heavily regulated quasi-
market with a considerable share of private for-profit providers. All active labor market measures 
conducted by private providers and not funded by vouchers (such as assessment measures, short-
term trainings and specialized courses for persons with disabilities) are now purchased in a 
competitive tendering process by five regional purchasing centers. The tendency of reducing the 
corporatist involvement can also be seen in the steering structures of the PES. The social partners 
have lost influence on operational policies as the day-to-day business has been transferred to a full-
time management board (Jantz & Jann, 2013). 
 
Implication of the marketization process on accountability relations 
The introduction of market elements into service provision has changed the accountability relations 
by introducing competition of providers, consumer choice and contract management through 
performance indicators. In the old system competition as a disciplinary force was hardly ever 
applied. In placement services the public monopoly prohibited competition until 1994; in the field of 
training and education programs the contracting-out system awarded contracts to an exclusive 
corporatist network. The voucher system should increase competition as private providers have to 
attract voucher holders. The accountability mechanism expected is that competition for potential 
clients will lead to a positive selection of efficient and effective providers. Competition in the 
tendering process is mainly achieved through price competition as the purchasing of employment 
services is primarily dependent on the price offered instead of service quality (Steinke et al., 2012). 
An impediment to including quality aspects was that, according to public procurement law, the use 
of previous information about the quality of service delivery was restricted (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit, 2011; Steinke et al., 2012). Changes made at the end of 2013 now facilitate the inclusion of 
quality into the contracting decision (Der Paritätische Gesamtverband, 2013). 
 
The second mechanism is user choice. Instead of using placement services of the FEA 
or being assigned to training courses by caseworkers, jobseekers receive vouchers and can 
choose their own providers. In the case of placement services for unemployment benefit I, the 
user, have a right to vouchers but can also decide to rely on public services. The last 
mechanism is intensified contract management through performance control by the FEA. The 
local employment offices carry-out participants surveys after a measure is completed, and an 
internal audit service has been introduced that is conducting inspections on a regular basis 
and a standardized procurement and contract management process has been implemented 
with quality control systems for the purchased measures (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2011). 
Furthermore, for all active labor market measures, an integration rate is calculated that 
indicates the integration into the labor market after the end of a measure allowing for a more 
targeted assignment to the different measures. 
 
Competition and user choice depend, however, on the transparency of the market. But 
transparency in the “employment market” is hardly given in Germany. Staff in the local 
employment agencies are not allowed to make recommendations to the jobseekers about the 
use of the training voucher, they only provide a list of approved courses. Yet the lists do not 
include vital information about the reintegration rates. A survey among 2.500 employees of 
the FEA has shown that only 30% of respondents saw transparency in the training sector as 
warranted (Doerr & Kruppe, 2012). The same has been stated for the private placement 
market (Bernhard & Kruppe, 2010). As a consequence, the possibility of informed consumers 
in the activation ‘market’ remains limited and the voucher system excludes those most in 
need of support, reinforcing social inequalities (Bernhard & Kruppe, 2010; Heyer, Koch, 
Stephan & Wolff, 2012). Thus, market mechanisms of accountability are combined with 
administrative mechanisms of accountability. Private providers as well as most of their services have 
to be certified according to input criteria such as capacity, personnel etc. In the first years after the 
‘Hartz reforms’ only providers of training measures had to be certified, but since 2012 providers of 
placement services also need certification. Likewise certification companies themselves must be 
certified by the national accreditation body, Deutsche Akkreditierungsstelle (DAkkS). 
 
In terms of coherence of the accountability regime problems occur as each of the 
involved organizations considers different aspects as important. Accreditation and 
certification are mainly based on input and process related criteria and have a proximity to 
the international ISO norms. The local employment agencies are more focused on 
implementation quality whereas the internal audit unit is looking at impact of the measures 
and regional purchasing centers focus mainly on price (Sauter, 2009). This accountability 
disorder becomes even more striking when it comes to the sanction mechanisms. Neither the 
local employment agencies nor the internal audit unit are legally allowed to impose direct 
sanctions on the provider. So the audit unit or local employment agency may find 
shortcomings, but nonetheless no sanctions will be imposed by the certification agency due to 
different assessment criteria. Finally, what can be observed is increasing government activity 
in regulating service delivery, thus adding another accountability layer to the system. The 
government’s attempts to create a competitive market and to ensure quality standards has led 
to detailed regulation of the certification process, the procurement procedures as well as 
audits and inspections. This case illustrates the complex balance between market competition, 
regulation, and consumer choice as well as between efficiency and equality. 
 
Great Britain 
The introduction of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and the reform of the 
PES (then the Employment Service and now Jobcentre Plus) in the early 1990s under the 
Conservatives heralded the definitive shift to employment service quasi-markets and 
performance based management and accountability in Britain (Gash, Panchamia, Sims & 
Hotson, 2013). The subsequent growth of contestability and performance outcome 
accountability has sharpened the focus on, and improved transparency over achievement of 
job outcomes. Yet, from the beginning creaming and parking of clients by providers and 
erosion of transparency to public and parliament associated with ‘commercial sensitivity’ of 
contractual relations, has weakened democratic accountability (Jones, 1997; Hart, Haughton, & 
Peck, 1996; Shutes & Taylor, 2014). Concerns regarding performance and evidence of fraudulent 
practice led to some public re-regulation and recentralization of training provision under Labour, 
with the TECs abolished in 2001 (Jones, 1997). A broader commitment to contracting out persisted, 
however, with the PES contracting directly with hundreds of providers to deliver ‘New Deal’ 
employment schemes and various pilot programs (Convery, 2009; DWP, 2007). By the mid- 2000s 
Labour was convinced that revisions to contracting out and outcome based payment could raise 
employment levels (Convery, 2009) resulting in a strengthening of market rationalization and greater 
provider discretion over delivery under Labour (2008-2010) (DWP, 2008) and the Coalition 
Government following the 2010 general election (Gash, Panchamia, Sims & Hotson, 2013). We 
concentrate here on the quasi-market reforms accompanying the Coalition’s introduction of the 
Work Programme in 2011. The Work Programme is premised upon market rationalization and 
consolidation, provider discretion, price competition, outcome based payments and limited 
reallocation of market share between providers based on their performance in securing client job 
outcomes. To encourage provider investment in infrastructure, promote market stability and reduce 
transaction costs the Ministry now only contracts directly with 18 large ‘Prime Providers’, for 
regionally based ‘Contract Package Areas’ (CPA), each with two to three ‘Prime Providers’ to 
facilitate intra contract area competition (House of Commons, 2014; DWP, 2013). A feature of most 
contracted out schemes prior to the Work Programme was the prescription of service provider 
activity by the Ministry. The shift to a payment by results model in the Work Programme has given 
providers greater control and discretion in the types of services they offer, who they provide 
them to and how often. Rather than the state setting common program standards each 
provider decides what its minimum service offer for clients is and agrees this with the 
Ministry which monitors this. The Work Programme differential payment model is weighted 
towards rewarding providers for securing sustained job outcomes for clients with varying 
levels of job readiness (e.g. young and older unemployed and economically inactive). The 
contract model, for example, includes different levels of payment for nine different categories 
of clients and makes payments primarily on the basis of sustained job outcomes (from year 
four of the contract outcome payments are 100% of total amount payable) (House of 
Commons, 2014). The premise is that a more sophisticated pricing model with stronger 
financial incentives is the best means to promote equity in service provision and achieve 
employment outcomes. 
 
Implication of the marketization process on accountability relations 
An already hybrid model of accountability, involving extensive contracting out has been remixed 
under the Coalition so that market accountability is more pre-eminent. Administrative and 
democratic oversight and control have been affected in terms of capacity to monitor program 
process and equity of provision, but market accountability has opened up new routes to public 
accountability. The accountability of the providers largely rests on whether market financial signals 
drive provider behavior as expected and here some evidence of the ineffectiveness of market 
mechanisms is emerging. There is growing evidence that economically inactive clients and the least 
job ready are parked by providers due to a contracting process that encouraged providers to 
underbid and a payment model that provides opportunities to invest mainly in the job ready 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012; 2014; Shutes and Taylor, 2014). So far no public re-
regulation has occurred as policymakers’ are content to allow market accountability instruments to 
operate and this has taken a variety of forms. First, following consistent poor performance, in 2014 
the Ministry required the lowest performing quarter of providers to develop a six month 
improvement plan (DWP, 2014a). Second, in August 2013, the lowest performing providers in ten 
CPAs received notification of a five percentage point reduction of future client referrals. These 
referrals were redirected to the higher performing provider within the CPA (DWP, 2013). Third, a 
break clause in provider contracts enabled the Ministry to announce in 2014 that the contract of the 
weakest performing provider was being terminated and retendered (DWP, 2014b).Unlike in a 
normal market there is little opportunity for service users to influence or punish providers for poor 
provision. The performance accountability relationship is really between each provider and the 
Ministry. Clients have no choice of provider, nor is there a possibility to exit for mandated 
participants. Voice is limited to a complaints process where service users complain first to their 
provider and then potentially to the Independent Case Examiner. Yet there is no program minimum 
service guarantee. Instead each provider agrees a separate minimum service standard, ostensibly to 
encourage innovation, with the Ministry. This variability however obfuscates the monitoring of 
contractual compliance by outside bodies, potentially impeding democratic accountability (Work 
and Pensions Committee, 2013). With private companies and charities not subject to the same 
parliamentary oversight and accountability as the public sector the line of democratic accountability 
is weakened (Finn, 2011). The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee for example has indicated 
that requests to the Ministry for information concerning Work Programme provision have been 
rejected on the ground of ‘commercial sensitivity’ (Public Accounts Committee, 2014). Aspects of 
administrative and democratic accountability have been eroded, but increased production, collation 
and release of performance outcome data can ‘activate’ administrative and democratic 
accountability. Performance accountability data is a crucial part of public debates and information 
dissemination by media, parliamentarians, policymakers and citizen or service user groups. 
Performance information has been used to support broad anti-marketization campaigns and to draw 
attention to inequities in provision and name and shame providers. The depoliticizing ‘distance’ of 
black box contracting is disrupted by such occurrences and public accountability, at least 
temporarily, is re-imposed. This brings in to play other market (contract compliance), democratic 
(Ministry controls) and administrative (audit and inspection) instruments as Ministers respond to 
pressure. In 2012 the former Head of Internal Audit of a major provider of employment services 
submitted evidence to the Public Accounts Committee alleging systematic improper practice 
amongst some providers of the preceding Labour Government’s ‘New Deals’. With the accused 
provider involved in delivering the Work Programme the scandal led to investigations by the police, 
the Ministry and audit bodies (Mason & Peacock, 2012; Gentleman, 2012). An internal audit by the 
Ministry uncovered localized examples of inadequate compliance with expected service standards 
and ‘erroneous’ claims for job outcomes. As a consequence the provider’s contract to deliver 
services in a separate pre- Work Programme employment scheme was terminated (DWP, 2012). The 
accountability of employment services in Britain has long been a hybrid model, involving extensive 
contracting out alongside administrative and democratic accountability relationships. The weight 
given to particular accountability relationships shifted as Labour and then the Coalition Government 
expanded and intensified market governance of employment services (Finn, 2011). Accountability 
for process and inputs (administrative control and democratic oversight of equity in provision) has 
been eased in favor of market accountability for employment results (job outcomes and 
sustainability). Yet, perverse incentives, outcomes and lack of equity stemming from marketization 
remain (Shutes & Taylor, 2014). 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Three questions were asked in the introduction of this article: Is the governance shift towards 
markets followed by a shift towards mechanisms of market accountability? How does the use of 
market accountability relate to other accountability forms? What are the democratic implications of 
market accountability in the governance of employment services? Regarding whether market 
solutions are followed by a shift towards mechanism of market accountability the case studies show 
that quasi-market accountability relationships are dynamic over time and between countries. 
Deregulation and re-regulation occur as policymakers seek to balance competition, client choice, 
risks to desired outcomes, and protection of service standards. In keeping with the broader 
movement of NPM-inspired reform processes (van Berkel, Sager & Ehrler, 2012), we see indeed a 
greater emphasis on price and competition, hence typical mechanisms of market accountability. 
Market accountability often rests on choosing the cheapest providers, at the same time as the 
performance related payment seeks to impose economic incentives to deliver high employment 
outcomes placing providers under cost pressure. However, the market accountability regime is not 
fully implemented, which becomes clear when studying the role of clients in the system. Consumer 
choice as a mechanism of market accountability has only been strengthened in Germany; but here, 
as in the other cases, mechanisms of voice and exit to hold service providers directly to account are 
also still fairly underdeveloped. 
 
Regarding how market accountability relate to other accountability forms we see both continuity 
and change. Market accountability is not, per se, a displacement of other accountability forms, 
rather it seems to co-exist and intersect with administrative and democratic accountability as 
policymakers oscillate between encouraging competition and freedom in delivery with control to 
cope with the unwanted consequences of market mechanisms. Network accountability seem 
however to be weakened. In Great Britain, social partners are not an institutionalized feature of 
employment service governance, but in both Germany and Denmark (corporatist) network 
governance has been weakened with reforms reducing or abolishing previous corporatist structures. 
These general trends in the development of other related accountability forms entails a considerable 
complexity as different instruments weave together a web of accountability relations and the 
patterning and reform trajectories for each state are not uni-directional. As we outline earlier we 
should expect the utilization of market instruments to reflect a balance of political and economic 
pressures, preferences, and institutional environments. The ‘liberal’ GB has responded to problems 
with successive marketization reforms by seeking a more perfect market system and better 
alignment of market incentives with government objectives. In contrast, Germany has tightened up 
the certification process as a means to re-regulate the market, and in Denmark a substantial process 
of public re-regulation and market shrinkage occurred.  
 
Finally, the democratic implications of market accountability in the governance of employment 
services are to be assessed. New market accountability instruments re-orientate the focus from 
hierarchy and control to price competition and outcome related financial incentives - they are 
additional instruments, not necessarily displacements (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, p. 16). Their 
effectiveness is open to question, but they do shape accountability processes. For example, the 
presence of multiple service providers and extended chains of contracts and subcontracts make the 
transparency of provider obligations and performance hard to discern. This makes it difficult for 
democratic accountees (service users, public bodies, media) to challenge the accountor (providers). 
In the German voucher system, the public employment service loses direct influence over providers. 
Providers are accountable mainly to the private certification companies, which themselves are 
indirectly accountable through the accreditation body. Such developments erode public support for 
reform and democratic forms of accountability, especially where contracting out is part of a strategy 
to distance ministers from service delivery and reduce democratic accountability, as in Denmark. Yet 
improvements in transparency through performance reporting can mean that elements of 
marketization complement democratic accountability by offering new routes for media, parliament, 
audit bodies and citizens to apply pressure. Service user experience and monitoring of providers can 
lead to naming and shaming, which, as in Great Britain, can feed into administrative and market 
sanctions that may hold providers accountable. In Denmark and Germany, the National Audit Office 
used such information to conclude private providers are less efficient compared to public 
employment services. To sum up, balancing accountability forms when employment services are 
marketized is a dynamic process in all three countries and we identify that specific hybridized modes 
of accountability have emerged in the different political institutional contexts of our three cases 
(Pierre 2012; Mahoney & Thelen 2010). 
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Table 1. Four ideal typical accountability relationships 
 Democratic Administrative Market  Network  
Source of control Party competition Hierarchy Competition Interdependence 
Dominant control 
mechanism  
Election  Regulations  Price and 
performance 
Reputation/ Long-term 
relationships 
Who is 
accountable 
Elected officials/ 
Ministries 
Agencies/ Public officials Firms  Network members 
Internal 
accountability 
Political Superior  Superior (political/ 
administrative)/ Peers 
 
Owners Network members 
External 
accountability  
Voters/ media/ 
interest groups 
Courts/ Ombudsmen/ 
Interest Groups/ Citizen 
 
Client or ‘proxy’ 
public purchasers 
 
Citizen/ Media/ Interest 
groups 
Consequences Political criticism or 
recognition. 
Recognition or 
dismissal/ voting 
out. 
Revision of the 
administrative act/ 
Sanction or recognition of 
the official involved 
Exit  
 
Loss of 
reputation/Exclusion from 
network 
 
